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A Public Key Cryptosystem Using Cyclotomic
Matrices
Md. Helal Ahmed, Jagmohan Tanti, Sumant Pushp
Abstract—Confidentiality and Integrity are two paramount
objectives in the evaluation of information and communication
technology. In this paper, we propose an arithmetic approach
for designing asymmetric key cryptography. Our method is
based on the formulation of cyclotomic matrices correspond to
the diophantine system. The proposed cyclotomic asymmetric
cryptosystem (CAC) utilizes the cyclotomic matrices, whose
entries are cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2, l be prime over
a finite field Fp of p elements. The method utilize cyclotomic
matrices to design a one-way function. The outcome of a one-
way function that is efficient to compute however difficult to
compute its inverse unless if secret data about the trapdoor is
known. We demonstrate that the encryption and decryption can
be efficiently performed with asymptotic complexity of O(e2.373).
Besides, we study the computational complexity of the CAC.
Index Terms—Finite fields, Discrete logarithm problem, Cy-
clotomic numbers, Cyclotomic matrix, Public key, Secret key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Apart from a rich history of Message encryption, the
cryptosystem became more popular in the 20th century upon
the evolution of information technology. Until the late 1970s,
all cryptographic message was transmitted by the symmetric
key. This implies somebody who has enough data to encode
messages likewise has enough data to decode messages. Con-
sequently, the clients of the framework must have to impart
the secret key furtively. As a result of an issue stealthily key
sharing, Diffie and Hellman [9] developed a totally new sort
of cryptosystem called public key cryptosystem.
In a Public key cryptosystem, both parties (in a two-party
system) have a pair of public enciphering and secret decipher-
ing keys [5], [6]. Any party can send encrypted messages to
a designated party using a public enciphering key. However,
only the designated party can decrypt the message using their
corresponding secret deciphering key [7]. After that numerous
public key cryptosystems were presented based on tricky
mathematical problems. Among these, RSA is the longest
viable utilization of cryptography. In spite of the fact that since
its design, despite everything it has not been broken at this
point. The security of the RSA is accepted to be founded on the
issue of the factorization of an enormous composite number.
Be that as it may, there are some practical issues in RSA
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execution. The main issue is the key arrangement time that
is unreasonably long for computationally restricted processors
utilized in certain applications. Another issue is the size of the
key. It was demonstrated [41] that the time required to factor
an n-bit integer by index calculus factorization technique is of
order 2n
1/2+δ
, δ > 0. In 1990’s, J. Pollard [40] demonstrated
that it was possible in time bounded by 2n
1/3+δ
, δ > 0.
The reduction of the exponent of n has significant outcomes
over the long run. It should likewise be expanded each year
as a result of upgrades in the factorization calculations and
computational power. Until 2015, it was prescribed the base
size of the RSA key should be 1024 bits and subsequently
increases to 4096 & 8192 bits by 2015 & 2025 respectively
[42]. While trying to remedy these issues, Discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) has been utilized (to reduce key setup time
and size of the key).
Discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is a mathematical prob-
lem that occurs in many settings and it is hard to compute ex-
ponent in a known multiplicative group [8]. Diffie-Hellman [9]
, ElGamal [10] , Digital Signature Algorithm [?], Elliptic curve
cryptosystems [43], [44] are the schemes developed under the
Discrete logarithm algorithm. The security of Diffie-Hellman
relied upon the complexity of solving the discrete logarithm
problem. However, this scheme has some disadvantages. It
has not been demonstrated that breaking the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange has relied upon DLP and also the scheme is
vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. For the security per-
spective, cryptosystem [10] was proposed to introduce a digital
signature algorithm (DSA) which is based on Diffie-Hellman
DLP and key distribution scheme. It was demonstrated that
DSA is around multiple times littler than the RSA signature
and later DSA has been supplanted by the elliptic curves
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). Nonetheless, it has some
practical implementation problems [46]–[49]. The length of
the smallest signature is of 320 bits, which is still being too
long for computationally restricted processors. Another issue
emerged is as a correlation with RSA in a field with prime
characteristics, which is forty times slower than RSA [45].
There are some other designs for public-key cryptosystems
based on some extensive features of matrices. However, there
were some practical implementation problems. Thus it had
never achieved wide popularity in the cryptographic commu-
nity. McElice [20] proposed a public key cryptosystem based
on the Goppa codes Hamming metric. The scheme has the
advantage that it has two to three orders of magnitude faster
than RSA. Despite its advantage, it has some drawbacks. It
has demonstrated that the length of the public key is 219 bits
2and the data expansion is too large. Some other extensions
of the scheme can also be found in [24]–[26]. Unfortunately,
this scheme and its variants have been broken in [27]–[29].
Gabidulin [21] introduced the rank metric and the Gabidulin
codes over a finite field with q element, where q = pr i.e.
Fq, as an alternative for the Hamming metric. The efficiency
of the scheme relied upon the fact that for the same set
of parameters, the complexity of the decoding algorithm for
random codes in rank metric is much higher than the Hamming
metric [20], [31]–[33]. Numerous fruitful attacks were utilized
on the structure of the public code [34]–[36]. To prevent these
attacks, numerous alterations of the cryptosystems were made,
consequently drastically increases the size of the key [37]–
[39]. Lau and Tan [22] proposed new encryption with a public
key matrix by considering the addition of a random distortion
matrix over Fq of full column rank n. There are also many
other designs on matrices, which are not cited here, but none
of them gain wide popularity in the cryptographic community
due to lack of efficient implementation problems in one and
another way.
Thinking about these inadequacies, it would be desirable to
have a cryptosystem dependent on other than the presumptions
as of now being used. Thus we propose a cyclotomy asymmet-
ric cryptosystem (CAC) based on strong assumptions of DLP
that have to reduce the key size and faster the computational
process.
A. Outline of our Scheme
In this paper, we consider two significant problems in
the theory of cyclotomic numbers over Fq . The first one
deals with an efficient algorithm for fast computation of
all the cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2, where l is prime.
The subsequent one deals with designing practical public
key cryptosystem based on cyclotomic matrices of order 2l2.
The strategy employs for designing public-key cryptosystem
utilizing cyclotomic matrices of order 2l2, whose entries are
cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2, l be prime, where cyclotomic
numbers are certain pairs of solutions (a, b)2l2 of order 2l
2
over a finite field Fq with characteristic p.
Cyclotomic numbers are one of the most important objects
in number theory. These numbers have been extensively used
in cryptography, coding theory and other branches of infor-
mation theory. Thus determination of cyclotomic numbers,
so called cyclotomic number problems, of different orders
is one of the basic problems in number theory. Complete
solutions for cyclotomic number problem for e = 2 − 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, l, 2l, l2, 2l2 with
l an odd prime have been investigated by many authors see
( [15]–[19] and the references there in). In our approach to
designing cyclotomy asymmetric cryptosystem (CAC) based
on the developed trapdoor one-way function (OWF). The
public key is obtained by choosing a non-trivial generator
γ ∈ F∗p. The chosen value of the generator constructs a
cyclotomic matrix of order 2l2. It is believed that cyclotomic
matrices of order 2l2 is always non-singular if the value of
k > 1. Since there are efficient algorithms for the construction
of cyclotomic matrices. Consequently, the key setup time in
our proposed cryptosystem is much shorter than previously
designed/recently structured cryptosystems.
In our scheme, the secret key is given by choosing a
different non-trivial generator, which is accomplished by dis-
crete logarithm problem (DLP) over a finite field F∗p. A key-
expansion algorithm is employed to expand the secret keys,
which form a non-singular matrix of order 2l2. Here it is
important to note that, if one can change the generators of F∗p,
then entries of cyclotomic matrices get interchanged among
themselves, however, the nature of the cyclotomic matrices
remain the same. The decryption algorithm involves efficient
algebraic operations of matrices. Hence the decryption in our
proposed CAC is very efficient. In view of the perspective on
the efficient encryption and decryption features, the polyno-
mial time algorithm ensures that the proposed CAC makes it
attractive in computationally restricted processors.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
definition and notations, including some well-known proper-
ties of cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2. Section III presents
the construction of cyclotomic matrices of order 2l2. Section
IV contains encryption and decryption algorithms of CAC
along with a numerical example. In addition, the computa-
tional complexity of the proposed CAC is discussed step-wise
in a mathematical language. Section V presents the encryption
and decryption can be efficiently perform with asymptotic
complexity ofO(e2.373). Finally, a brief conclusion is reflected
in Section VI.
II. CYCLOTOMIC NUMBERS
One of the central problems in the study of cyclotomic
numbers is the determination of all cyclotomic numbers of
a specific order for a given finite field in terms of solutions of
certain Diophantine systems. Complete solutions to the cyclo-
tomy problem over a finite field Fq with characteristic p have
been investigated by many authors for some specific orders.
The problem of cyclotomy of order 2l2 concerns to formulate
all 4l4 cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2. The section contains
the generalized definition of cyclotomic numbers of order e,
useful notations followed by properties of cyclotomic numbers
of order 2l2. These properties play a major role in determining
which cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2 are sufficient for the
determination of all 4l4 cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2. The
section also examines the cyclotomic matrices of order 2l2.
A. Definition and notations
Let e ≥ 2 be an integer, and p ≡ 1 (mod e) an odd prime.
One writes p = ek+1 for some positive integer k. Let Fp be
the finite field of p elements and let γ be a generator of the
cyclic group F∗p. For 0 ≤ a, b ≤ e− 1, the cyclotomic number
(a, b)e of order e is defined as the number of solutions (s, t)
of the following:
γes+a + γet+b +1 ≡ 0 (mod p); 0 ≤ s, t ≤ k− 1. (1)
B. Properties of cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2
Let p ≡ 1 (mod 2l2) be a prime for an odd prime l and we
write p = 2l2k+1 for some positive integer k. It is clear that
3(a, b)2l2 = (a
′, b′)2l2 whenever a ≡ a
′ (mod 2l2) and b ≡ b′
(mod 2l2) as well as (a, b)2l2 = (2l
2 − a, b − a)2l2 . These
imply the following:
(a, b)2l2 =
{
(b, a)2l2 if k is even,
(b+ l2, a+ l2)2l2 if k is odd.
(2)
Applying these facts, one can check that
2l2−1∑
a=0
2l2−1∑
b=0
(a, b)2l2 = q − 2 (3)
and
2l2−1∑
b=0
(a, b)2l2 = k − na, (4)
where na is given by
na =
{
1 if a = 0, 2 | k or if a = l2, 2 ∤ k;
0 otherwise .
III. CYCLOTOMIC MATRICES
This section presents the procedure to determine cyclotomic
matrices of order 2l2 for prime l. We determine the equality
relation of cyclotomic numbers and discuss how few of the
cyclotomic numbers are enough for the construction of whole
cyclotomic matrix. Further generators for a chosen value of p
will be determined followed by the generation of a cyclotomic
matrix. At every step, we have included a numerical example
for the convenience to understand the procedure easily.
Definition:- Cyclotomic matrix of order 2l2, l be a prime, is
a square matrix of order 2l2, whose entries are pair of solutions
(a, b)2l2 ; 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 2l
2 − 1, of the equation (1).
TABLE I
CYCLOTOMIC MATRIX OF ORDER 8
(a,b) b
a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,6) (0,7)
1 (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4) (1,5) (1,6) (1,7)
2 (2,0) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3) (2,4) (2,5) (2,6) (2,7)
3 (3,0) (3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,5) (3,6) (3,7)
4 (4,0) (4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4) (4,5) (4,6) (4,7)
5 (5,0) (5,1) (5,2) (5,3) (5,4) (5,5) (5,6) (5,7)
6 (6,0) (6,1) (6,2) (6,3) (6,4) (6,5) (6,6) (6,7)
7 (7,0) (7,1) (7,2) (7,3) (7,4) (7,5) (7,6) (7,7)
For instance Table I depicts a typical cyclotomic matrix of
order 8 (assuming l = 2). Whose construction steps have been
given in the next subsection.
A. Construction of cyclotomic matrix
Typically construction of a cyclotomic matrix has been
subdivided into four subsequent steps. Below are those ordered
steps for the construction of a cyclotomic matrix;
1) For given l, choose a prime p such that p satisfies p =
2l2k + 1, k ∈ Z+. The initial entries of the cyclotomic
matrix are the arrangement of pair of numbers (a, b)2l2
where a and b usually vary from 0 to 2l2 − 1.
2) Determine the equality relation of pair of (a, b)2l2 , which
reduces the complexity of pair of solution (a, b)2l2 of
equation (1), that is discuss in next sub-section.
3) Determine the generators of chosen p (i.e. generators of
F∗p). Let γ1, γ2, γ3, . . . , γn be generators of F
∗
p.
4) Choose a generator (say γ1) of F
∗
p and put in equation
(1). This will give cyclotomic matrix of order 2l2 w.r.t.
chosen generator γ1.
The first step initializes the entries of cyclotomic matrix of
order 2l2. Value of p will be determined for given l. Assuming
l = 2, an example of such initialization of matrix of order 8
has been shown in Table I.
For the construction of cyclotomic matrix, it does not
require to determine all the cyclotomic numbers of a cyclo-
tomic matrix which is shown in Table I [23]. By well-known
properties of cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2, cyclotomic
numbers are divided into various classes, therefore there are a
pair of the relation between the entries of initial table (Table I)
of a cyclotomic matrix. Thus to avoid calculating the same
solutions in multiple times, we determine the equality relation
of cyclotomic numbers (i.e. equality of solutions of (a, b)2l2 ).
In the next subsection, we will discuss which cyclotomic
numbers are enough for the construction of the cyclotomic
matrix. Thus it helps us to the faster computation of cyclotomic
matrix.
B. Determination of equality relation of cyclotomic numbers
This subsection presents the procedure to determine the
equality relation of cyclotomic numbers (i.e. the relation of
pair of (a, b)2l2 ), which reduces the complexity of solutions
of pair of (a, b)2l2 (see also [23]). For the determination
of cyclotomic matrices, it is not necessary to obtain all 4l4
cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2. The minimum number of
cyclotomic numbers required to determine all the cyclotomic
numbers (i.e. required for construction of cyclotomic matrix)
depends on the value of positive integer k on expressing prime
p = 2l2k + 1. By (2), if k is even, then
(a, b)2l2 = (b, a)2l2 = (a− b,−b)2l2 = (b− a,−a)2l2
= (−a, b− a)2l2 = (−b, a− b)2l2 (5)
otherwise
(a, b)2l2 = (b + l
2, a+ l2)2l2 = (l
2 + a− b,−b)2l2
= (l2 + b− a, l2 − a)2l2 = (−a, b− a)2l2
= (l2 − b, a− b)2l2 . (6)
Thus by (5) and (6), cyclotomic numbers (a, b)2l2 of order 2l
2
can be divided into various classes.
• 2|k and l 6= 3: In this case, (5) gives classes of singleton,
three and six elements. (0, 0)2l2 form singleton class,
(−a, 0)2l2 , (a, a)2l2 , (0,−a)2l2 form classes of three
elements where 1 ≤ a ≤ 2l2 − 1 (mod 2l2) and rest
4l4− 3× 2l2+2 of the cyclotomic numbers form classes
of six elements.
4• 2|k and l = 3: In this case, (5) divide cyclotomic numbers
(a, b)18 of order 18 into classes of singleton, second, three
and six elements. (0, 0)18 form singleton class, (−a, 0)18,
(a, a)18, (0,−a)18 form classes of three elements, where
1 ≤ a ≤ 17 (mod 18), (6, 12)18 = (12, 6)18 which is
grouped into classes of two elements and rest 4l4−3×2l2
of the cyclotomic numbers form classes of six elements.
• 2 ∤ k and l 6= 3: Using (6), once again we get classes of
singleton, three and six elements. (0, l2)2l2 forms single-
ton class, (0, a)2l2 , (a + l
2, l2)2l2 , (l
2 − a,−a)2l2 form
classes of three elements, where 0 ≤ a 6= l2 ≤ 2l2 − 1
(mod 2l2) and rest 4l4 − 3 × 2l2 + 2 of the cyclotomic
numbers form classes of six elements.
• 2 ∤ k and l = 3: In this situation, (6) partitions cyclotomic
numbers (a, b)18 of order 18 into classes of singleton,
two, three and six elements. Here (0, 9)18 form singleton
class, (0, a)18, (a + 9, 9)18, (9 − a,−a)18 form classes
of three elements, where 0 ≤ a 6= 9 ≤ 17 (mod 18),
(6, 3)18 = (12, 15)18 which is grouped into classes of
two elements and rest 4l4 − 3 × 2l2 of the cyclotomic
numbers form classes of six elements.
Algorithm 1 Equality relation of cyclotomic numbers
1: START
2: Declare integer variable e, l, p, k, f lag.
3: INPUT l, an odd prime and e = 2l2
4: Declare an array of size e×e, where each element of array
is 2 tuple structure (i.e. ordered pair of (a, b)2l2 , where a
and b are integers).
5: INPUT p, prime number greater than 2
6: if (p− 1)%e == 0 then
7: k = (p− 1)/e
8: if k even then
9: Update table (E)
10: else
11: Update table (O)
12: end if
13: end if
Here Update table (E) means each entry (a, b)2l2 of the
table will be updated by applying the relations (a, b)2l2 =
(b, a)2l2 = (a− b,−b)2l2 = (b−a,−a)2l2 = (−a, b−a)2l2 =
(−b, a − b)2l2 , and Update table (O) means each entry
(a, b)2l2 of the table will be updated by applying the relations
(a, b)2l2 = (b + l
2, a + l2)2l2 = (l
2 + a − b,−b)2l2 =
(l2 + b − a, l2 − a2l2) = (−a, b− a)2l2 = (l
2 − b, a− b)2l2 .
Further, if entries of the updated table are non-negative, then
each entry should be replace by (mod 2l2), otherwise add
2l2. It is clear from above exploration, cyclotomic numbers
of order 2l2 are divided into different classes depending on
the values of k and l. For l = 2 and let k be even, then
(0, 0)8 give unique solution, cyclotomic numbers of the form
(−a, 0)8, (a, a)8, (0,−a)8 where 1 ≤ a ≤ 7 (mod 8) gives
the same solutions and rest of cyclotomic numbers (i.e. 42)
which forms classes of six elements has maximum 7 distinct
numbers of solutions. Therefore the initial table (i.e. Table I)
of cyclotomic matrix reduces to Table II. Similarly, for l = 2
and let k be odd, then (0, 4)8 give unique solution, cyclotomic
numbers of the form (0, a)8, (a+ 4, 4)8, (4− a,−a)8 where
0 ≤ a 6= 4 ≤ 7 (mod 8) gives the same solutions and
rest of cyclotomic numbers (i.e. 42) which forms classes of
six elements has maximum 7 distinct numbers of solutions.
Therefore the initial table (i.e. Table I) of cyclotomic matrix
reduces to Table III. One can observe that 64 pairs of two
parameter numbers (a, b)8 reduced to 15 distinct pairs (see
Table II and Table III).
TABLE II
CYCLOTOMIC MATRIX OF ORDER 8 FOR EVEN K
(a,b) b
a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,6) (0,7)
1 (0,1) (0,7) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4) (1,5) (1,6) (1,2)
2 (0,2) (1,2) (0,6) (1,6) (2,4) (2,5) (2,4) (1,3)
3 (0,3) (1,3) (1,6) (0,5) (1,5) (2,5) (2,5) (1,4)
4 (0,4) (1,4) (2,4) (1,5) (0,4) (1,4) (2,4) (1,5)
5 (0,5) (1,5) (2,5) (2,5) (1,4) (0,3) (1,3) (1,6)
6 (0,6) (1,6) (2,4) (2,5) (2,4) (1,3) (0,2) (1,2)
7 (0,7) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4) (1,5) (1,6) (1,2) (0,1)
TABLE III
CYCLOTOMIC MATRIX OF ORDER 8 FOR ODD K
(a,b) b
a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,6) (0,7)
1 (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (0,5) (0,3) (1,3) (1,7)
2 (2,0) (2,1) (2,0) (1,7) (0,6) (1,3) (0,2) (1,2)
3 (1,1) (2,1) (2,1) (1,0) (0,7) (1,7) (1,2) (0,1)
4 (0,0) (1,0) (2,0) (1,1) (0,0) (1,0) (2,0) (1,1)
5 (1,0) (0,7) (1,7) (1,2) (0,1) (1,1) (2,1) (2,1)
6 (2,0) (1,7) (0,6) (1,3) (0,2) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1)
7 (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (0,5) (0,3) (1,3) (1,7) (1,0)
a) Remark 3.0: By Algorithm 1, to compute 2l2 cyclo-
tomic numbers, it is enough to compute 2l2+
⌈
(2l2−1)(2l2−
2)/6
⌉
, if (2l2−1)(2l2−2)|6, otherwise 2l2+
⌈
(2l2−1)(2l2−
2)/6
⌉
+ 1. Further, when l is the least odd prime i.e. l = 3,
then (2l2 − 1)(2l2 − 2) ∤ 6. Therefore l = 3, it is enough to
calculate 64 distinct cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2 and for
l 6= 3, it is sufficient to calculate 2l2 + (2l2 − 1)(2l2 − 2)/6
distinct cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2.
C. Determination of generators of F∗p
To determine the solutions of (1), we need the generator
of the cyclic group F∗p. Let us choose finite field of order p
that satisfy p = 2l2k + 1; k ∈ Z+. Let γ1, γ2, γ3, . . . , γn
be generators of F∗p. We consider finite field of order 17 (i.e.
F17), since the chosen value of p = 17 with respect to the
value of l take previously. Now to determine the generators of
cyclic group F∗17. The detail procedure to obtain the generator
of F∗17 has been depicted in Algorithm 2. If G17 is a set that
contain all the generator of F∗17, we could get elements of G17
as {3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14}.
5Algorithm 2 Determination of generators of F∗p
1: Declare integer variable p, count
2: Declare integer array arrFp[p], arrFpflag[p]
3: for i = 1 to p− 1 do
4: arrFp[i] = i, arrFpflag[i] = 0
5: end for
6: Declare integer array arrGp[max]
7: Declare integer variable flag = 0, r, γ
8: for i = 1 to p− 1 do
9: count=0
10: for f = 1 to p− 1 do
11: arrFpflag[f ] = 0
12: end for
13: γ = arrFp[i]
14: for a = 1 to p− 1 do
15: r = power(γ, a) (mod p)
16: for j = 1 to p− 1 do
17: if r is equal to arrFp[j] then
18: arrFpflag[j] = 1
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: for k = 1 to p− 1 do
23: if arrFpflag[k] is equal to 1 then
24: count++
25: end if
26: end for
27: if count is equal to p− 1 then
28: γ is generator
29: end if
30: end for
D. Generation of cyclotomic matrices
This subsection, present an algorithm for the generation
of cyclotomic matrices of order 2l2. Note that entries of
cyclotomic matrices are solutions of (1). Thus we need the
generator of the cyclic group F∗p, which is discussed in the
previous subsection. On substituting the generators of F∗p in
Algorithm 3, we obtain the cyclotomic matrices of order 2l2
corresponding to different generators of F∗p. The chosen value
of p = 17 implies k = 2 w.r.t. assume value of l = 2.
Therefore the cyclotomic matrix will be obtain from Table II.
Let us choose a generator (say γ1 = 3) from set G17. On
substituting γ1 = 3 in Algorithm 3, it will generate cyclotomic
matrix of order 8 over F17 w.r.t. chosen generator γ1 = 3.
Matrix B0 show the corresponding cyclotomic matrix of order
8 w.r.t. chosen generator 3 ∈ F∗17.
B0 =


0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0


Algorithm 3 Generation of cyclotomic matrix
1: INPUT: The value of p, l, γ
2: Declare an array arr[ROW ][COL] (where elements are
two tuple structure)
3: Declare integer variable p, l, k, γ, x, y, A, s, t, a, b,
count = 0, p1, p2
4: for a equal to 0 to number of rows do
5: for b equal to 0 to number of columns do
6: for x is equal to 0 to k do
7: for y is equal to 0 to k do
8: p1 = 2l
2 ∗ s+ arr[a][b].l
9: p2 = 2l
2 ∗ t+ arr[a][b].m
10: A = power(γ, p1) + power(γ, p2) + 1
11: if A (mod p) is equal to 0 then
12: count++
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: arr[a][b].n = count
17: count = 0
18: end for
19: end for
a) Remark 3.1: It is noted that if we change the genera-
tor of F∗p, then entries of cyclotomic matrices get interchanged
among themselves but their nature remains the same.
b) Remark 3.2: It is obvious that (by (4)) cyclotomic
matrices of order 2l2 is always singular if the value of k = 1.
IV. THE PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section, we present the approach for designing a
public key cryptosystem using cyclotomic matrices discussed
in section III. The scheme employ matrices of order 2l2, whose
entries are cyclotomic numbers of order 2l2. The public key is
a non-trivial generator, say γ′ of a set of generator in F∗p along
with p and l. The set of generator is obtain by Algorithm 2.
The chosen public keys generate a cyclotomic matrix as of
required order (i.e. order of 2l2) make use of Algorithm 3.
Here, we define a trapdoor one-way function Ψ : F∗p −→ F
∗
p as
Ψ(r0) = logγ′(γ
′′); r0 ∈ N, γ
′, γ′′ are non-trivial generators
of F∗p. Thus, the secret key are the values of p, l, γ
′′ & r0. To
encrypt a message, define composition of matrix as M2l2(A ∗
B) −→ M2l2(C), where A is a message block matrix, B is
a cyclotomic matrix w.r.t. γ′ ∈ F∗p and C is the ciphertext
matrix. Other way one can define M2l2(B ∗A) −→M2l2(C).
Therefore, the length of the ciphertext in CAC is equal to 2l2.
To decrypt a message, an algorithm is required to expand
the secret keys provided by the secret values. Therefore, the
Algorithm 4 is utilized for this purpose.
Algorithm 4 Secrete key expansion
1: SECRET INPUT: The values of p, l, r0 and γ
′′
2: Algorithm 1
3: Algorithm 3
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construct a non-singular cyclotomic matrix of order 2l2 w.r.t.
non-trivial generator γ′′ (γ′′ 6= γ′) in F∗p. Now to decrypt the
message, we define inverse composition relation of matrices,
which is M2l2(C ∗Z) −→M2l2(A), where matrix Z is obtain
by some efficient algebraic computation of matrix. Other way
one can define M2l2(Z ∗ C) −→M2l2(A) respectively.
A. Determination of matrix Z
The following steps have been taken for the determination
of matrix Z .
1) Determine the equality of cyclotomic matrix of order
2l2 corresponding to the secret values of p & l, which
is perform by Algorithm 1.
2) Each entry of equality of cyclotomic matrix is multiplied
by r0.
3) Compute the inverse of equality of cyclotomic matrix
generated in step 2.
4) Finally, on substitution the values of the generated
cyclotomic matrix corresponding to γ′′ to an inverse
matrix in step 3.
The following two algorithms (i.e. Algorithm 5 & 6) are
utilized to encrypt and decrypt a message in the proposed
CAC, respectively.
Algorithm 5 Encryption
1: Transfer the plain text (message) into its numerical value
and store in matrix of order 2l2
2: PUBLIC INPUT: The values of p, l and γ′
3: Execute Algorithm 3
4: Check: Generated cyclotomic matrix in step 3 is non-
singular
5: Cipher matrix: Multiply cyclotomic matrix and the matrix
generated in step 1
6: Ciphertext: The corresponding text values of matrix gen-
erated in step 5
Algorithm 6 Decryption
1: Input: The cipher matrix/ciphertext
2: Execute Algorithm 4
3: Each entries of equality of cyclotomic matrix (i.e. output
matrix of Algorithm 1) is multiply by r0. The entries of
the generated matrix are pair of cyclotomic number
4: Compute the inverse of generated matrix in step 3 and
substitute the value of each pair of cyclotomic number
from generated matrix in step 2
5: Now multiply the cipher text matrix to generated matrix
in step 4, we get back to the original plain text message.
B. Computational complexity of the CAC
In this section, we would validate the computational com-
plexity of the proposed CAC. The computational complexity
measures the amount of computational effort required, by
the best as of now known techniques, to break a system
[6]. However, it is exceptionally hard to demonstrate the
computational complexity of public-key cryptosystems [5],
[6]. For instance, if the public modulus of RSA is factored
into its prime components, at that point the RSA is broken.
Be that as it may, it isn’t demonstrated that breaking RSA
is identical to factoring its modulus [51]. Here, we study the
computational complexity of the CAC by providing arguments
related to the inversion of the one-way function in CAC to
a best known computational algorithm. The complexity of
anonymous decryption could be understood as; if we assume
that an attacker wants to recover the secret key by using all
the information’s available to them. Then they need to solve
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) to find the secret key
followed by a number of steps described in Algorithm 6. Since,
the one-way function is define analogous to discrete logarithm
problem (DLP). However, although most mathematicians and
computer scientists believe that the DLP is unsolvable [3].
The complexity of the DLP depends on the cyclic group. It is
believed to be a hard problem for the multiplicative group of
a finite field of large cardinality. Therefore even determining
the very first step is nearly unsolvable.
If it is the case that somehow attacker manages to solve the
DLP, then they have to determine equation (1) and calculate all
the solutions corresponding to different pairs (a, b)2l2 . Further,
it is required to determine the relation matrix based on equality
relation among the solutions of equation (1). Where entries
of the relation matrix are the two-tuple structure of (a, b)2l2 .
Finally, entries of inverse of the relation matrix are required
to replace through the implication of DLP.
Here we could observe the computational complexity as it
increases with the value of p and 2l2. Therefore it is nearly
impossible to determine the secret key for a large value of
p and 2l2; hence uphold the secure formulation claim of the
proposed work.
C. An example of the CAC
In this section, we provide an example for the proposed
CAC. The example is designed according to guidelines de-
scribed in section IV. The main purpose of this example is
to show the reliability of our cryptosystem. It is important to
note that this example is non-viable for the proposed CAC,
since the values of the parameters are too small.
Let us consider 2l2 = 8 (i.e. l = 2) and p = 17. Suppose
we want to send a message X whose numerical value store in
matrix A of order 8.
A =


2 3 5 9 8 0 2 1
1 5 9 2 9 3 0 5
2 1 3 2 5 6 8 7
5 3 0 7 8 7 3 1
4 2 3 1 9 8 7 3
0 9 2 3 5 6 8 9
1 0 2 9 6 7 9 8
9 1 3 2 4 4 5 6


We choose two distinct non-trivial generators of a set of
generator in F∗17 (the set of generator is obtain by employing
Algorithm 2), say γ′ = 11 and γ′′ = 3. Now, we evaluate
7the complex relation between these chosen generators, which
can perform by DLP. One can write 37 = 11 (mod 17).
Consider that r0 = 7. The public key is the public values
l = 2, p = 17 & γ′ = 11 and the private key is the secret
values l = 2, p = 17, r0 = 7 & γ
′′ = 3. The public values
generated cyclotomic matrix of order 8 as required, which is
B3 =


0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0


Determinant of B3 is equal to 1, implies non-singular. Now
we encrypt the message A by multiplying matrix B3 and A,
which is as follows:
C=B3× A =


2 1 3 2 5 6 8 7
5 12 2 10 13 13 11 10
11 4 8 11 12 4 7 7
5 7 12 3 18 11 7 8
14 4 3 9 12 11 8 7
2 5 11 11 15 10 9 13
1 9 4 12 11 13 17 17
6 3 6 3 14 14 15 10


The matrix C is a ciphertext matrix. To transmit the message,
entries of the matrix converted into text. To decrypt the
message, first, we expand the secret keys which are performed
by Algorithm 4. It generates a non-singular cyclotomic matrix
of order 8, which is shown by matrix B0. Now each entry of
equality of cyclotomic matrix (i.e. output matrix of Algorithm
1) is multiplied by r0 = 7. We get matrix D whose entries are
pair of cyclotomic numbers.
D =

(0, 0) (0, 7) (0, 6) (0, 5) (0, 4) (0, 3) (0, 2) (0, 1)
(0, 7) (0, 1) (1, 2) (1, 6) (1, 5) (1, 4) (1, 3) (1, 2)
(0, 6) (1, 2) (0, 2) (1, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (2, 4) (1, 6)
(0, 5) (1, 6) (1, 3) (0, 3) (1, 4) (2, 5) (2, 5) (1, 5)
(0, 4) (1, 5) (2, 4) (1, 4) (0, 4) (1, 5) (2, 4) (1, 4)
(0, 3) (1, 4) (2, 5) (2, 5) (1, 5) (0, 5) (1, 6) (1, 3)
(0, 2) (1, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (2, 4) (1, 6) (0, 6) (1, 2)
(0, 1) (1, 2) (1, 6) (1, 5) (1, 4) (1, 3) (1, 2) (0, 7)


Now compute the inverse of D and substitute the value from
B0 to each pair of cyclotomic numbers. The matrix becomes
D∗ =


−1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 −1 0 1 −1 1
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 −1 1 −1
−1 0 0 −1 0 1 0 1
1 −1 0 1 1 −1 1 −1


Finally, we obtain D∗× C = A.
V. THE COMPLEXITY OF CAC
Time and space are usually prominent factors to establish
the effectiveness of security solutions. In the before seen
sections, we have established the computation difficulty to
break the presented work. Further, we would demonstrate the
complexity of the solution in terms of worst-case running time.
The time complexity of Algorithm 1 in worst case is
O(e2). Since creation of matrix of order e and Update Table()
individually will take O(e2). In algorithm 2, for loop in line
number 9, 15, and 17 contributes O(e3) in worst case. Since,
e =
p− 1
k
e3 =
(
p− 1
k
)3
≡
(
p3
k3
)
Since k is a positive integer, therefore when k attains its
minimum value i.e. 1,
p3
k3
≡ p3 ≡ e3
For any higher value of k, there is guarantee that
p3
k3
< e3
Hence we can conclude that Algorithm 2 can take O(e3) in
worst case.
Similarly in Algorithm 3, for loop in line number 4, 5, 6,
7 contributes e. e. k. k or say O(e2k2) running time in worst
case. Using similar analogy as in case of Algorithm 2, worst
case complexity will be O(e2).
A. Encryption
Encryption as expressed in Algorithm 5 constitutes of three
logical divisions and the complexity of encryption would be
the sum of the complexity of its part. The state divisions within
are as follows;
1) Generating cyclotomic matrix
2) Checking the singularity of the cyclotomic matrix.
3) Multiplication of generated cyclotomic matrix and ma-
trix corresponds to plain text.
Starting from the generation of the cyclotomic matrix,
comprises the total complexityO(e2) as stated earlier. Further,
checking singularity involves the computation of determinants
of the matrix of order e. In worst case computing determinant
of a matrix of order e by fast algorithm [1] takes O(n2.373).
Hence singularity of the cyclotomic matrix could be computed
in O(e2.373) time. Finally multiplication of cyclotomic matrix
of order e and matrix corresponds to plain text of order e
will take O(e2.3728639) time. Therefore, Complexity of En-
cryption would become; O(e2)+O(e2.373)+O(e2.3728639) ≡
O(e2.373). Finally a polynomial time complexity seems to be
quite worthwhile.
B. Decryption
Decryption as expressed in Algorithm 6 initially imply
Algorithm 4 which sums the complexity of Algorithm 1 and
3, therefore takes O(e2) + O(e2) ≡ O(e2) time. Further,
multiplication of cyclotomic matrix of order e by a constant
value r0, therefore yield O(e
2) complexity. Inverse of a
matrix of order e can be computed by a fast algorithm
8[1] in O(n2.373), therefore in our case inverse of generated
matrix of order e could be computed in O(e2.373) time.
Finally multiplication of two matrix of order e could be
computed in O(e2.3728639) by best known algorithm [2] till
date. Therefore, Complexity of decryption would be O(e2) +
O(e2) +O(e2.373) + O(e2.3728639), which becomesO(e2.373).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a secured asymmetric
key cryptography model applying the principle of cyclotomic
numbers over a finite field. Procedure to generate cyclotomic
matrix along with public & private key have been presented
where the relation between the public & private key has
acquired by discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Finally, a con-
vincing argument to strengthen the claim has been presented
followed by the method of encryption, decryption, and a
numerical example.
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